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Rational Choice and Deterrence

SOC371

Chuck Lanfear

Jan 25, 2020
Updated: Jan 24, 2021

1 / 23

Overview

  1. Context for Deterrence and Rational Choice

  2. Deterrence Theory

    • Certainty, Severity, Celerity
    • General vs. Specific

  3. Rational Choice Theory

  4. Matseuda, Kreager, & Huzinga (2006)

2 / 23

Context

  • Criticism of the classical school lead to rejection of rational actor
3 / 23

Went a little far--more structural, more deterministic theories--often called "oversocialized" perspectives.

Context

  • Criticism of the classical school lead to rejection of rational actor

  • Criminology dominated by subcultural theories well into 1970s.

    • Crime as irrational behavior resulting from socialization
3 / 23

Went a little far--more structural, more deterministic theories--often called "oversocialized" perspectives.

These include differential association, differential opportunity, strain theory, etc.

Subcultural theories usually focus on normative conflict or difference: Crime occurs because people are members of subcultures that reject conventional norms and have pro-crime norms.

Context

  • Criticism of the classical school lead to rejection of rational actor

  • Criminology dominated by subcultural theories well into 1970s.

    • Crime as irrational behavior resulting from socialization

  • Attacks on rehabilitation in 70's and 80's

    • Focus on deterring crime rather than fixing criminals
3 / 23

Went a little far--more structural, more deterministic theories--often called "oversocialized" perspectives.

These include differential association, differential opportunity, strain theory, etc.

Subcultural theories usually focus on normative conflict or difference: Crime occurs because people are members of subcultures that reject conventional norms and have pro-crime norms.

Move toward rehabilitative model in 1960s and onward was not associated with dropping crime

People became pessimistic--"there's nothing to be done"--so just lock folks up and throw away key

Context

  • Criticism of the classical school lead to rejection of rational actor

  • Criminology dominated by subcultural theories well into 1970s.

    • Crime as irrational behavior resulting from socialization

  • Attacks on rehabilitation in 70's and 80's

    • Focus on deterring crime rather than fixing criminals

  • James Q. Wilson's (1975) Thinking About Crime

    • Respond harshly so those on fence don't get idea that crime pays.
3 / 23

Went a little far--more structural, more deterministic theories--often called "oversocialized" perspectives.

These include differential association, differential opportunity, strain theory, etc.

Subcultural theories usually focus on normative conflict or difference: Crime occurs because people are members of subcultures that reject conventional norms and have pro-crime norms.

Move toward rehabilitative model in 1960s and onward was not associated with dropping crime

People became pessimistic--"there's nothing to be done"--so just lock folks up and throw away key

James Q. Wilson was influential political scientist and policy writer. Focused on crime a lot.

Thinking About Crime introduced idea of incapacitation as mechanism for crime reduction in places with higher penalties.

We'll talk about incapacitation more later.

Also wrote the original Broken Windows article with George Kelling and was pro War on Drugs on moral grounds.

Context

  • Criticism of the classical school lead to rejection of rational actor

  • Criminology dominated by subcultural theories well into 1970s.

    • Crime as irrational behavior resulting from socialization

  • Attacks on rehabilitation in 70's and 80's

    • Focus on deterring crime rather than fixing criminals

  • James Q. Wilson's (1975) Thinking About Crime

    • Respond harshly so those on fence don't get idea that crime pays.

Rather than focus on the intervening work first, we begin at deterrence.

3 / 23

Went a little far--more structural, more deterministic theories--often called "oversocialized" perspectives.

These include differential association, differential opportunity, strain theory, etc.

Subcultural theories usually focus on normative conflict or difference: Crime occurs because people are members of subcultures that reject conventional norms and have pro-crime norms.

Move toward rehabilitative model in 1960s and onward was not associated with dropping crime

People became pessimistic--"there's nothing to be done"--so just lock folks up and throw away key

James Q. Wilson was influential political scientist and policy writer. Focused on crime a lot.

Thinking About Crime introduced idea of incapacitation as mechanism for crime reduction in places with higher penalties.

We'll talk about incapacitation more later.

Also wrote the original Broken Windows article with George Kelling and was pro War on Drugs on moral grounds.

Deterrence is still fundamental basis for most crime policy. If penalties go up, crime should go down.

Deterrence and Rationality

Deterrence is framed now in terms of rational choice but has long been basis from criminal legal policy

  • Classical school foundation
4 / 23

As seen in week 1, deterrence goes back to Beccaria and Bentham.

It entered US CJ policy at foundation of nation and hasn't gone anywhere. More or less same into Europe.

Deterrence and Rationality

Deterrence is framed now in terms of rational choice but has long been basis from criminal legal policy

  • Classical school foundation

  • Gary Becker's (1968) Economic Model of Crime

4 / 23

As seen in week 1, deterrence goes back to Beccaria and Bentham.

It entered US CJ policy at foundation of nation and hasn't gone anywhere. More or less same into Europe.

First well-known general utility model of crime.

Becker was focusing on optimal calibration of punishment in CJ system--mostly deterrence

Deterrence and Rationality

Deterrence is framed now in terms of rational choice but has long been basis from criminal legal policy

  • Classical school foundation

  • Gary Becker's (1968) Economic Model of Crime

  • Bringing agency back in

4 / 23

As seen in week 1, deterrence goes back to Beccaria and Bentham.

It entered US CJ policy at foundation of nation and hasn't gone anywhere. More or less same into Europe.

First well-known general utility model of crime.

Becker was focusing on optimal calibration of punishment in CJ system--mostly deterrence

Swinging pendulum back to actors as being decision-makers and away from deterministic cultural theories

Deterrence and Rationality

Deterrence is framed now in terms of rational choice but has long been basis from criminal legal policy

  • Classical school foundation

  • Gary Becker's (1968) Economic Model of Crime

  • Bringing agency back in

  • Rational choice reintroduced classical model in more realistic terms

    • People are on average rational
    • People respond to incentives
    • Structural position and context matter
4 / 23

As seen in week 1, deterrence goes back to Beccaria and Bentham.

It entered US CJ policy at foundation of nation and hasn't gone anywhere. More or less same into Europe.

First well-known general utility model of crime.

Becker was focusing on optimal calibration of punishment in CJ system--mostly deterrence

Swinging pendulum back to actors as being decision-makers and away from deterministic cultural theories

People do not pick optimal choice every time but do on average

Key is that people respond to incentives

People's perceived rewards are idiosyncratic and taste-based; mainly just know that on average people want more, whatever it is

Deterrence and Rationality

Deterrence is framed now in terms of rational choice but has long been basis from criminal legal policy

  • Classical school foundation

  • Gary Becker's (1968) Economic Model of Crime

  • Bringing agency back in

  • Rational choice reintroduced classical model in more realistic terms

    • People are on average rational
    • People respond to incentives
    • Structural position and context matter
  • Since criminal behavior seems irrational, it is a "hard test" for a theory of rational actors
4 / 23

As seen in week 1, deterrence goes back to Beccaria and Bentham.

It entered US CJ policy at foundation of nation and hasn't gone anywhere. More or less same into Europe.

First well-known general utility model of crime.

Becker was focusing on optimal calibration of punishment in CJ system--mostly deterrence

Swinging pendulum back to actors as being decision-makers and away from deterministic cultural theories

People do not pick optimal choice every time but do on average

Key is that people respond to incentives

People's perceived rewards are idiosyncratic and taste-based; mainly just know that on average people want more, whatever it is

If rational choice can explain criminality well, it can likely explain more rational things as well

Deterrence Doctrine

Deterrence is simply the idea that punishment can impact crime.

  • People respond to incentives
5 / 23

Deterrence Doctrine

Deterrence is simply the idea that punishment can impact crime.

  • People respond to incentives

Weaker assumptions than classical school

Rational actor assumptions:

  • In aggregate, individuals act rationally
5 / 23

If you look at large groups together, on average they behave rationally

Deterrence Doctrine

Deterrence is simply the idea that punishment can impact crime.

  • People respond to incentives

Weaker assumptions than classical school

Rational actor assumptions:

  • In aggregate, individuals act rationally

  • At margin, individuals act rationally

5 / 23

If you look at large groups together, on average they behave rationally

People may not act perfectly rationally, but they do respond

If punishment increases, people will commit less crime; if gains increase, more.

Deterrence Doctrine

Deterrence is simply the idea that punishment can impact crime.

  • People respond to incentives

Weaker assumptions than classical school

Rational actor assumptions:

  • In aggregate, individuals act rationally

  • At margin, individuals act rationally

Crime can be controlled by increasing its cost

5 / 23

If you look at large groups together, on average they behave rationally

People may not act perfectly rationally, but they do respond

If punishment increases, people will commit less crime; if gains increase, more.

Marginal vs. Absolute

  • Absolute Deterrence

    • Deterrent effect of a penalty vs. no penalty
    • Will decriminalizing drugs result in more drug use?
    • Less research here, but evidence is fairly strong, depending on the crime
6 / 23

This is question of whether any penalty at all has an effect on a behavior.

Marginal vs. Absolute

  • Absolute Deterrence

    • Deterrent effect of a penalty vs. no penalty
    • Will decriminalizing drugs result in more drug use?
    • Less research here, but evidence is fairly strong, depending on the crime

  • Marginal Deterrence

    • Deterrent effect of a penalty compared to different penalty
    • Does the death penalty reduce more crime than life sentences?
    • Most research focused here--evidence is mixed
6 / 23

This is question of whether any penalty at all has an effect on a behavior.

This is if increasing or decreasing penalties increases or decreases behavior.

Variables in Deterrence

  • Certainty

    • Probability of being sanctioned--likelihood of pay cost
    • Objective Measures:
      • Arrest or clearance rate
      • Proportion of offenders prosecuted
    • Subjective Measure: Perceived punishment probability
    • Tittle's "Shell of Illusion"
7 / 23

Tittle's Shell of Illusion: Those never committing a crime--and thus never getting away with it--overestimate sanction risk.

This is related to the illusion most people have that certain types of law violation are incredibly rare; since at least Rome philosophers have stated that if people knew how often laws were broken, they too would break them.

Variables in Deterrence

  • Certainty

    • Probability of being sanctioned--likelihood of pay cost
    • Objective Measures:
      • Arrest or clearance rate
      • Proportion of offenders prosecuted
    • Subjective Measure: Perceived punishment probability
    • Tittle's "Shell of Illusion"

  • Severity

    • Severity of the sanction
    • This is the cost
    • Objective Measures: Sentence length; fine amount
    • Subjective Measure: Perceived suffering
7 / 23

Tittle's Shell of Illusion: Those never committing a crime--and thus never getting away with it--overestimate sanction risk.

This is related to the illusion most people have that certain types of law violation are incredibly rare; since at least Rome philosophers have stated that if people knew how often laws were broken, they too would break them.

Subjective usually involves asking people "how bad would it be to be arrested / incarcerated"

Variables in Deterrence

  • Certainty

    • Probability of being sanctioned--likelihood of pay cost
    • Objective Measures:
      • Arrest or clearance rate
      • Proportion of offenders prosecuted
    • Subjective Measure: Perceived punishment probability
    • Tittle's "Shell of Illusion"

  • Severity

    • Severity of the sanction
    • This is the cost
    • Objective Measures: Sentence length; fine amount
    • Subjective Measure: Perceived suffering

  • Celerity (Swiftness)

    • Length of time between crime and sanction
7 / 23

Tittle's Shell of Illusion: Those never committing a crime--and thus never getting away with it--overestimate sanction risk.

This is related to the illusion most people have that certain types of law violation are incredibly rare; since at least Rome philosophers have stated that if people knew how often laws were broken, they too would break them.

Subjective usually involves asking people "how bad would it be to be arrested / incarcerated"

Not often used

Time discounting in economics--a loss or gain in the future is worth less than one now

Not real relevant in US system due to everything being slow

The slowness may actually be a severity component too; people know they'll spend a lot of time even waiting for a hearing or trial

General vs. Specific Deterrence

8 / 23

General Deterrence

Does the threat of punishment deter people from crime?

  • Perceived threat of sanctions deters individuals from crime
  • Based on perception, not personal experience
  • Punish so that others see they too will be punished
  • About reducing crime in general
9 / 23

General Deterrence

Does the threat of punishment deter people from crime?

  • Perceived threat of sanctions deters individuals from crime
  • Based on perception, not personal experience
  • Punish so that others see they too will be punished
  • About reducing crime in general

Research Approaches

  • Changes in crime rates before/after policy changes
  • Effects of perceived risk and severity
  • Effect of peers being arrested
9 / 23

Specific Deterrence

Does being punished deter people from committing more crime?

  • Experience of punishment deters individuals from future crime
  • Based on experience, occurs only after punishment
  • About reducing recidivism
10 / 23

Specific deterrence is about keeping people from reoffending

If they were punished once, they will realize they don't want that to happen again

Specific Deterrence

Does being punished deter people from committing more crime?

  • Experience of punishment deters individuals from future crime
  • Based on experience, occurs only after punishment
  • About reducing recidivism

Research Approaches

  • Compare incarcerated then released vs. probationers
    • But those sent to prison may be more crime prone
    • Experimental design: Need equivalent treatment and control groups
  • Randomly vary punishment
    • Lab experiments
    • Randomized arrest (e.g. Sherman & Berk 1984)
  • Look at marginal cases--natural experiments
    • Same crime probation vs. incarceration
    • Harsher vs. more lenient judges
10 / 23

Specific deterrence is about keeping people from reoffending

If they were punished once, they will realize they don't want that to happen again

Specific deterrence can be hard to research--punishment often does more than just punish.

Not really ethical to experimentally vary real punishments; can try in experiments

Rational Choice

11 / 23

Rational Choice Model

Deterrence focuses on the sanctioning.

Rational choice is a general theory of behavior--not limited to crime.

12 / 23

Rational Choice Model

Deterrence focuses on the sanctioning.

Rational choice is a general theory of behavior--not limited to crime.

Full rational choice models recognize variation in gains.

  • Includes material and psychic gains
  • e.g. Piliavin, Thornton, Gartner, & Matsueda (1986)
12 / 23

Article found better support for rational response to rewards than to formal deterrence

Later work often shows similar--may be due to low risk of apprehension

Rational Choice Model

Deterrence focuses on the sanctioning.

Rational choice is a general theory of behavior--not limited to crime.

Full rational choice models recognize variation in gains.

  • Includes material and psychic gains
  • e.g. Piliavin, Thornton, Gartner, & Matsueda (1986)

12 / 23

Article found better support for rational response to rewards than to formal deterrence

Later work often shows similar--may be due to low risk of apprehension

Formalization

Rational choice models typically take a formal mathematical form.

E(U)=(1−p)U(y)+pU(y−F) "Expected utility E(U) is function of the value of crime U(y), the likelihood of being caught p, and the penalty if caught F"

13 / 23

This is conventional economic utility model

Don't estimate exact values, but rather takes advantage of basic properties

All else equal, reducing reward / increasing cost reduces value and thus likelihood of crime.

Formalization

Rational choice models typically take a formal mathematical form.

E(U)=(1−p)U(y)+pU(y−F) "Expected utility E(U) is function of the value of crime U(y), the likelihood of being caught p, and the penalty if caught F"

Becker (1968) introduced rational model of crime

  • Little impact in sociology or criminology.
  • Assumed full information
  • Material gains compared to gains from legitimate job
13 / 23

This is conventional economic utility model

Don't estimate exact values, but rather takes advantage of basic properties

All else equal, reducing reward / increasing cost reduces value and thus likelihood of crime.

First major economic treatment of crime as rational behavior

Mainly focused on criminal justice policy

Formalization

Rational choice models typically take a formal mathematical form.

E(U)=(1−p)U(y)+pU(y−F) "Expected utility E(U) is function of the value of crime U(y), the likelihood of being caught p, and the penalty if caught F"

Becker (1968) introduced rational model of crime

  • Little impact in sociology or criminology.
  • Assumed full information
  • Material gains compared to gains from legitimate job

Short & Strodtbeck (1964) -- decision to join a gang fight

  • Subjective probability of harm
  • Bounded rationality
  • Status and psychic rewards
13 / 23

This is conventional economic utility model

Don't estimate exact values, but rather takes advantage of basic properties

All else equal, reducing reward / increasing cost reduces value and thus likelihood of crime.

First major economic treatment of crime as rational behavior

Mainly focused on criminal justice policy

Mixed methods work revealing participation in gang fights as rational behavior

Gang leader decides whether or not to join a fight

If he decides not to, likely he will likely suffer moderate status loss with gang

If he does join fight, small chance he will need to shoot someone and end up in jail -- large cost

Because likelihood of jail is small, he'll probably join fight--it is rational to do so

Matsueda, Kreager, Huizinga. 2006. "Deterring Delinquents: A rational choice model of theft and violence." American Sociological Review

14 / 23

Premise

Rational choice hypothesis: Perceived cost/benefit impacts future crime

  • Crime = Pr(Reward) ∗ Value(Reward) > Pr(Cost) ∗ Value(Cost)
15 / 23

That is, crime occurs when reward weighted by likelihood of getting it is higher than sanction risk weighted by likelihood.

Premise

Rational choice hypothesis: Perceived cost/benefit impacts future crime

  • Crime = Pr(Reward) ∗ Value(Reward) > Pr(Cost) ∗ Value(Cost)

Research Questions:

  • How are perceived risks formed?

  • How do perceived risks and rewards influence crime?

15 / 23

That is, crime occurs when reward weighted by likelihood of getting it is higher than sanction risk weighted by likelihood.

Premise

Rational choice hypothesis: Perceived cost/benefit impacts future crime

  • Crime = Pr(Reward) ∗ Value(Reward) > Pr(Cost) ∗ Value(Cost)

Research Questions:

  • How are perceived risks formed?

  • How do perceived risks and rewards influence crime?

‍Data: Denver Youth Survey

  • Annual panel survey of high-risk youth
  • Self-reported delinquency and crime
  • Perceived risk of arrest
  • Perceived rewards of crime
  • Wide range of crimes
    • Focus here is violence and theft
15 / 23

That is, crime occurs when reward weighted by likelihood of getting it is higher than sanction risk weighted by likelihood.

1526 youth surveyed over 10 waves--only first five have rat choice questions

Very detailed questions on involvement in crime, perceptions of it, background

Perceived Risk Theory

‍Deterrence: Perceptions should be rooted in reality

  • Experiential Learning
    • Baseline estimate of perceived risk is overestimated (Tittle 1980)
    • New information used to update
16 / 23

Perceived risks come from real experiences

Those who have never committed a crime think they're likely to be caught

When they get away with it (or get punished), they update perceptions--this is a Bayesian updating model

Perceived Risk Theory

‍Deterrence: Perceptions should be rooted in reality

  • Experiential Learning
    • Baseline estimate of perceived risk is overestimated (Tittle 1980)
    • New information used to update
  • Measure for Perceived Arrest Risk
    • Experienced certainty: Arrests/Crimes for each person
    • Unsanctioned offenses: Number of crimes for non-arrested
    • Crimes of peers
      • Peers getting away with crime is information
16 / 23

Perceived risks come from real experiences

Those who have never committed a crime think they're likely to be caught

When they get away with it (or get punished), they update perceptions--this is a Bayesian updating model

DYS has actual arrests and committed crimes for respondents

Know number of unsanctioned offenses

Also know crimes of their peers--we assume peers getting away with it (or being sanctioned) gives info

Formation of Perceived Arrest Risk

17 / 23

Baseline risk is perceived risk of arrest at last survey

New info is unsanctioned offenses, arrests, and delinquency of peers since last survey.

Updated risk is current survey.

The model is somewhat more complicated: Preceding neighborhood and individual characteristics also predict all three.

Perceived Risk of Arrest

18 / 23

Find support for shell of illusion: High risk perceived by those not comitting

Then risk increases with experienced certainty. Looks basically same for violence.

People who never committed a crime perceive risk of sanctions similarly to those who did and were always caught

Rational Choice Theory

  • Rewards

    • Excitement
    • Being seen as cool
19 / 23

Focus here on psychic gains, both direct (excitement) and from status (being seen as cool)

Rational Choice Theory

  • Rewards

    • Excitement
    • Being seen as cool

  • Cost

    • Arrest
19 / 23

Focus here on psychic gains, both direct (excitement) and from status (being seen as cool)

Main analyzed cost here is arrest but they also investigated trouble with parents, risk of ending up in jail or reform school

Similar but weaker effects compared to arrest

Rational Choice Theory

  • Rewards

    • Excitement
    • Being seen as cool

  • Cost

    • Arrest

  • Certainty (Probability)

    • "What are the chances of getting (excitement/coolness/arrested) for (theft/violence)?"
19 / 23

Focus here on psychic gains, both direct (excitement) and from status (being seen as cool)

Main analyzed cost here is arrest but they also investigated trouble with parents, risk of ending up in jail or reform school

Similar but weaker effects compared to arrest

Measured as a percentage in 10 point increments

Rational Choice Theory

  • Rewards

    • Excitement
    • Being seen as cool

  • Cost

    • Arrest

  • Certainty (Probability)

    • "What are the chances of getting (excitement/coolness/arrested) for (theft/violence)?"

  • Severity (Value)

    • "How good or bad is this?"
19 / 23

Focus here on psychic gains, both direct (excitement) and from status (being seen as cool)

Main analyzed cost here is arrest but they also investigated trouble with parents, risk of ending up in jail or reform school

Similar but weaker effects compared to arrest

Measured as a percentage in 10 point increments

5 point scale

The cost or benefit ends up as a variable equal to the certainty times the value.

Rational Choice Theory

  • Rewards

    • Excitement
    • Being seen as cool

  • Cost

    • Arrest

  • Certainty (Probability)

    • "What are the chances of getting (excitement/coolness/arrested) for (theft/violence)?"

  • Severity (Value)

    • "How good or bad is this?"
  • Opportunity
19 / 23

Focus here on psychic gains, both direct (excitement) and from status (being seen as cool)

Main analyzed cost here is arrest but they also investigated trouble with parents, risk of ending up in jail or reform school

Similar but weaker effects compared to arrest

Measured as a percentage in 10 point increments

5 point scale

The cost or benefit ends up as a variable equal to the certainty times the value.

Also address reality that crime can't be committed without the opportunity to do so, so asks if they had the opportunity to commit crimes

Rational Choice and Crime

20 / 23

Original participation in crime predicts perceived risks and gains as well as future crime

Future crime predicted by these perceived risks and gains

Findings

  • Small deterrent effect

    • 10% risk increase -> 3% theft, 5% violence reduction
    • 10% reduction in coolness -> 6% theft, 7% violence reduction
21 / 23

Evidence for modest deterrent effect, but relationship much stronger with rewards

Youth more sensitive to the gains than the costs

Findings

  • Small deterrent effect

    • 10% risk increase -> 3% theft, 5% violence reduction
    • 10% reduction in coolness -> 6% theft, 7% violence reduction

  • US already has high arrest and imprisonment rates

    • Would be draconian to increase substantially
    • Marginal deterrence is weak
21 / 23

Evidence for modest deterrent effect, but relationship much stronger with rewards

Youth more sensitive to the gains than the costs

Not practical to increase risk sufficiently to deter these crimes

Findings

  • Small deterrent effect

    • 10% risk increase -> 3% theft, 5% violence reduction
    • 10% reduction in coolness -> 6% theft, 7% violence reduction

  • US already has high arrest and imprisonment rates

    • Would be draconian to increase substantially
    • Marginal deterrence is weak

  • Some level of arrest and incarceration essential

    • Absolute deterrence likely important
21 / 23

Evidence for modest deterrent effect, but relationship much stronger with rewards

Youth more sensitive to the gains than the costs

Not practical to increase risk sufficiently to deter these crimes

Complete removal of threat likely to increase crime substantially

Findings

  • Small deterrent effect

    • 10% risk increase -> 3% theft, 5% violence reduction
    • 10% reduction in coolness -> 6% theft, 7% violence reduction

  • US already has high arrest and imprisonment rates

    • Would be draconian to increase substantially
    • Marginal deterrence is weak

  • Some level of arrest and incarceration essential

    • Absolute deterrence likely important

  • Deterrence not a panacea for crime problem

    • Need to address rewards to crime
21 / 23

Evidence for modest deterrent effect, but relationship much stronger with rewards

Youth more sensitive to the gains than the costs

Not practical to increase risk sufficiently to deter these crimes

Complete removal of threat likely to increase crime substantially

Can't punish our way out of this. Better to address, in particular, psychic gains of crime.

Questions

22 / 23

For Next Time

  • Sherman, Lawrence W., and Richard A. Berk. 1984. "The Deterrent Effect of Arrest for Domestic Assault." Pp. 357-361 in Classics of Criminology. Edited by J. E. Jacoby. Prospect Heights: Waveland

  • Cohen, Lawrence and Marcus Felson. 1979. "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach." American Sociological Review 44(4): 588-608

Things to pay attention to:

  • Different costs involved in deterrence (e.g. arrest vs. incarceration)

  • Relationship between routine activities, deterrence, and rational choice

  • Potential causes of changes in crime that don't involve offender motivation

  • Policy implications for deterrence and routine activities

23 / 23

Overview

  1. Context for Deterrence and Rational Choice

  2. Deterrence Theory

    • Certainty, Severity, Celerity
    • General vs. Specific

  3. Rational Choice Theory

  4. Matseuda, Kreager, & Huzinga (2006)

2 / 23
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